Before I start pontificating on MQM's withdrawal from the federal cabinet, there are a couple of pieces everyone needs to read, especially before they read mine. First up, is Cyril Almeida with an analysis on the whys and hows of this latest bit of political theatre. Secondly, read Ahsan's piece on the same topic, which has a good collection various nuanced conjectures on the issue.
I'm going to start off by laying down 2 assumptions:
1) The MQM withdrawal was not done as a long term government-making strategy. It was done solely as a consequence of grievances between two coalition partners, as a result of which one decided to opt out.
2) The PML-N does not want to come into power during such troubled times. They're having a tough time governing Punjab as it is, and they can't stand to lose more credibility by making fools of themselves at the center
Let's start with Ahsan's conjecture number two which states:
'...The MQM, like the JUI(F), is probably just acting like an attention-seeking child and wants its concerns heard. If the PPP makes enough of a show of hearing their concerns on things like local government and Zulfiqar Mirza, they’ll get back in line.'
Throwing toys out of the pram is something the MQM and the JUI-F are quite used to doing. But what exactly instigated these latest tantrums?
The Hajj scandal was quite indicative of a couple of things, especially when we see it in the light of what eventually happened. Firstly, the real thing JUI-F wanted from the Hajj fiasco was the sacking of Hamid Saeed Kazmi as Minister of Religious Affairs. Quite obviously, the JUI-F wanted the religious ministry for itself. As the only religious party in the coalition, it didn't see the logic behind PPP holding the ministry for one of its own members, while they get to run housing and other non-sawab earning components of government. The greater divide was, of course, between the Barelvi Kazmi and the Deobandi ideology of the JUI-F. Not content with Sherani's appointment as the CII head, Fazal-ur-Rehman probably wanted a complete monopoly over all religio-political instituions at the federal level. To go with this, there is also a lot of talk of how the Saudi's were secretly backing Azam Swati and the JUI-F against Kazmi because of their long-standing sectarian biases.
So once the JUI-F backed out of the coalition, even the reluctant olive branch extended by the PPP, was not enough to pull it back in.
Let's turn to the MQM. What did they want from the PPP? Well firstly, as much as people overplay this, i think the Zulfiqar Mirza episode is just one aspect of the real problem here. As Ahsan mentioned in passing, it's the local government issue that is probably of bigger concern right now, and the longer local body elections are delayed, the more MQM feels its power slipping away in Karachi. The PPP has dithered on setting a concrete date for local elections, partially due to the security situation, and partially due to the fact that the PML-N has opposed all such efforts in Punjab. You can't have elections in three provinces and not have them in the fourth.
Secondly, the JUI-F had two (three?) ministries with only 7 members in the National Assembly. On the other hand, the MQM with their 25 member strong block, also had only 2 ministries, out of which one was the relatively unimportant office of Overseas Pakistanis. It's pretty easy to see why they'd be more than a little miffed at all this. I know i'd be if i were in their place too.
It's hard to come up with an objective assessment of whatever happened primarily because there are far too many variables that go unaccounted for. What was the army's role in all this? Why did Altaf Bhai come out all guns blazing against the PML-N? Everyone who has half an eye on these shenanigans would know that the sensible thing to do right now is to watch and wait.
Wednesday, 29 December 2010
Tuesday, 28 December 2010
Challenging Discourse: The Balochistan Question in Punjab
A tendency to ignore possible lessons from mistakes made in the past seems to have become a recurring theme in the way this country is governed. 16th of December came and passed, with the general level of unease, suppressed anguish, and awkwardness that we’ve traditionally reserved for all things related to ‘that’ particular chapter in our history. A sense of guilt pervades in certain quarters, while other quarters still hold a grudge, using this particular day to refresh sentiments of betrayal and treachery, and of subversive machinations undertaken by an ever-plotting enemy. If anything, 39 years on from that fateful day, Pakistan, and the Pakistani state in particular, has yet to separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff that could allow it to come up with an objective assessment of history.
But all things considered, there is still a tug at the consciousness of our intelligentsia and the urban public, particularly in Punjab. Regardless of the fact that the tug comes from a distorted image of history, it continues to suggest an association with Bangladesh, as a geographical entity that was once part of this country. Worryingly enough though, despite the presence of an expanded media sphere, there is a definite lack of association with roughly the same set of problems surrounding a totally different part of the country.
A few weeks ago, during a civil society conference in Balochistan, a local NGO worker remarked that the plight of the Baloch people was not being heard in Punjab. Sift through expedient ethnic strokes and it’s fairly easy to see how even moderate, and educated Baloch provincialists remain disenchanted with public discourse about their province in urban areas across the rest of the country. For example, major centers of opinion generation in Punjab, which includes print and electronic media, universities, and other public platforms, rarely talk about Balochistan,. Even when the topic is brought up, it is normally done in terms of ‘foreign’ involvement, primordial suppression under a suffocating tribal system, and near-orientalist depictions of wild and untamed territory. Needless to say these are hardly ingredients for nuanced opinion formation.
It’s true that the problems in Balochistan are multi-faceted and not easy to grasp. But it’s also true that, as history has taught us, the real policy-makers will continue to see the problem first and foremost as a military issue, despite alternate attempts by the political government. The problem with both the myopic anti-insurgency perspective, and its passive consumption by the public at large is that it creates an artificial distinction between the geographical territory of Balochistan, and the people who happen to reside in it.
For the army, this is a question of maintaining the sanctity of the Federation. A piece of land, that’s a part of Pakistan, needs to be defended and protected at all costs - against threats emanating from both domestic as well as foreign actors. As a military question, it remains a fight for land, nothing more, and nothing less. But what is happening by portraying the problem in a singular dimension is that the process of alienating the Baloch public continues to gain impetus on a daily basis. Political attempts at engaging with the disenchanted population have also either been subverted by the powers-that-be, or have been too meek to begin with.
The lesson that the state needs to learn from this mess is that there is no artificial sanctity of land, which magically transcends the people who reside on it. Pakistan is a country with 180 million people. Without those people, the little scribble on a map is of no importance whatsoever. In the same vein, problems in Balochistan are not just of security/defense concerns, but are also humanitarian issues of a very fundamental nature. Yes, there have been protests and legal interventions over the 2000 plus missing persons, but the simple fact that intra-provincial fractures are perpetuating show that such voices have been too few and far between to win back the trust and confidence of the Baloch population.
It is in situations like these where public opinion is of crucial importance in setting the boundaries of the policy agenda. We see continuation of the current policy trajectory precisely due to the fact that the rest of the country, especially the intelligentsia in urban central Punjab, has been disinterested and has hence absorbed discourse on Balochistan as the security apparatus has framed it. To challenge this current discourse would be a very concrete step towards a peaceful solution.
It is at this time when Punjab needs to step up and play it’s part as the largest province in a federation. The media, academia and even the religious authorities need to look beyond tribalism and the barren topography and see this as a humanitarian issue, where long-standing problems of inequality and oppression are being compounded by armed conflict. If there is a reason to mourn the secession of Bangladesh, it is that there was tremendous loss of innocent human life. This should be the very same reason that dictates a re-orientation in our understanding of the long-standing problems in Balochistan.
Originally published in Pakistan Today on the 27th of December.
But all things considered, there is still a tug at the consciousness of our intelligentsia and the urban public, particularly in Punjab. Regardless of the fact that the tug comes from a distorted image of history, it continues to suggest an association with Bangladesh, as a geographical entity that was once part of this country. Worryingly enough though, despite the presence of an expanded media sphere, there is a definite lack of association with roughly the same set of problems surrounding a totally different part of the country.
A few weeks ago, during a civil society conference in Balochistan, a local NGO worker remarked that the plight of the Baloch people was not being heard in Punjab. Sift through expedient ethnic strokes and it’s fairly easy to see how even moderate, and educated Baloch provincialists remain disenchanted with public discourse about their province in urban areas across the rest of the country. For example, major centers of opinion generation in Punjab, which includes print and electronic media, universities, and other public platforms, rarely talk about Balochistan,. Even when the topic is brought up, it is normally done in terms of ‘foreign’ involvement, primordial suppression under a suffocating tribal system, and near-orientalist depictions of wild and untamed territory. Needless to say these are hardly ingredients for nuanced opinion formation.
It’s true that the problems in Balochistan are multi-faceted and not easy to grasp. But it’s also true that, as history has taught us, the real policy-makers will continue to see the problem first and foremost as a military issue, despite alternate attempts by the political government. The problem with both the myopic anti-insurgency perspective, and its passive consumption by the public at large is that it creates an artificial distinction between the geographical territory of Balochistan, and the people who happen to reside in it.
For the army, this is a question of maintaining the sanctity of the Federation. A piece of land, that’s a part of Pakistan, needs to be defended and protected at all costs - against threats emanating from both domestic as well as foreign actors. As a military question, it remains a fight for land, nothing more, and nothing less. But what is happening by portraying the problem in a singular dimension is that the process of alienating the Baloch public continues to gain impetus on a daily basis. Political attempts at engaging with the disenchanted population have also either been subverted by the powers-that-be, or have been too meek to begin with.
The lesson that the state needs to learn from this mess is that there is no artificial sanctity of land, which magically transcends the people who reside on it. Pakistan is a country with 180 million people. Without those people, the little scribble on a map is of no importance whatsoever. In the same vein, problems in Balochistan are not just of security/defense concerns, but are also humanitarian issues of a very fundamental nature. Yes, there have been protests and legal interventions over the 2000 plus missing persons, but the simple fact that intra-provincial fractures are perpetuating show that such voices have been too few and far between to win back the trust and confidence of the Baloch population.
It is in situations like these where public opinion is of crucial importance in setting the boundaries of the policy agenda. We see continuation of the current policy trajectory precisely due to the fact that the rest of the country, especially the intelligentsia in urban central Punjab, has been disinterested and has hence absorbed discourse on Balochistan as the security apparatus has framed it. To challenge this current discourse would be a very concrete step towards a peaceful solution.
It is at this time when Punjab needs to step up and play it’s part as the largest province in a federation. The media, academia and even the religious authorities need to look beyond tribalism and the barren topography and see this as a humanitarian issue, where long-standing problems of inequality and oppression are being compounded by armed conflict. If there is a reason to mourn the secession of Bangladesh, it is that there was tremendous loss of innocent human life. This should be the very same reason that dictates a re-orientation in our understanding of the long-standing problems in Balochistan.
Originally published in Pakistan Today on the 27th of December.
Wednesday, 22 December 2010
'Dont be touching my ministry bitchez'
Interesting happenings in Islamabad today. The bill of the 19th amendment was approved (244-1) amidst federation fanfare and pats on the back, but was quickly followed by the news that some members were having a delayed reaction to the last piece of federation fanfare, i.e. the 18th amendment. According to this news-report, (tweeted by Ammar Rashid), the Education Minister and the NA standing committee on Education are having second thoughts about devolving their subject to the provinces.
Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, the man who runs education in this country (as authorized by the collective will of The People) and is someone who's long been hailed as an 'educated' politician, had these choice words for the 18th amendment bill: '“I voted for it unintentionally". Just before that he also said he 'could not understand the nitty-gritty of the bill at that time because it was too complicated.'
Win.
Also, one of our beloved sons of dharti-e-Punjab, and someone who I've doted on previously as well, Abid Sher Ali, decided that this seemed like a good enough excuse to get the National Assembly Standing Committee on Education back in the headlines, and himself back in front of the television cameras.
Here are some of the anti-devolution reasons given by the assorted array of tools who run our education system:
1) 'Devolution would mean destruction of the state organs'.
Oh Noez.
The provincial education departments will probably feel a bit miffed at being relegated to the status of excess state fat or at best, appendices in the state system.
2) '...before giving power to provinces for developing their own curriculum it should be kept in mind that there was no national curriculum at the time of dismemberment of Pakistan and it was one of the major reasons for the separation of East Pakistan.'
In one long-winded sentence, Sardar sb. has completely challenged all notions of revisionist history. The truth is, had we taught them Urdu and Islamiat, there would've been no rebellion, no Bangladesh, and 16th of December would've been like the 15th or the 14th. A uniform curriculum ensures federative perfection, right Balochistan?
3) 'Committee Member Zubaida Jalal, who was the federal education minister in the previous regime, went as far as calling the plan to hand the education ministry to the provinces a threat to the federation'.
See point number 2.
4) Carrying on Zubaida Jalal also stated '...she feared that provinces would make changes in the history, Islamic studies and geography books in the absence of a national curriculum, which ultimately would lead to ‘national ruin’ and Urdu would no longer be the national language'.
Would've loved to hear more on that bit about 'national ruin'. Also, I need to see some of these nefarious geographical designs that the provinces have apparently been harboring.
On a serious note, control over the education curriculum has been one of the reasons why the Pakistani state continues to exhibit such staunch authoritarian tendencies. It is also precisely the reason we haven't had a well-functioning federal system in the country. Mohammad Bin Qasim is not my hero. Neither is Shah Wali Ullah. Urdu is not my mother tongue. I would've complained about this had there been a Muslim League government in charge but without the element of surprise. To see this coming from the PPP, supposedly the party of wafaaq and the zanjeer of 4 provinces, is simply depressing.
May the Force be with Pakistan. We sure as hell need it.
Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, the man who runs education in this country (as authorized by the collective will of The People) and is someone who's long been hailed as an 'educated' politician, had these choice words for the 18th amendment bill: '“I voted for it unintentionally". Just before that he also said he 'could not understand the nitty-gritty of the bill at that time because it was too complicated.'
Win.
Also, one of our beloved sons of dharti-e-Punjab, and someone who I've doted on previously as well, Abid Sher Ali, decided that this seemed like a good enough excuse to get the National Assembly Standing Committee on Education back in the headlines, and himself back in front of the television cameras.
Here are some of the anti-devolution reasons given by the assorted array of tools who run our education system:
1) 'Devolution would mean destruction of the state organs'.
Oh Noez.
The provincial education departments will probably feel a bit miffed at being relegated to the status of excess state fat or at best, appendices in the state system.
2) '...before giving power to provinces for developing their own curriculum it should be kept in mind that there was no national curriculum at the time of dismemberment of Pakistan and it was one of the major reasons for the separation of East Pakistan.'
In one long-winded sentence, Sardar sb. has completely challenged all notions of revisionist history. The truth is, had we taught them Urdu and Islamiat, there would've been no rebellion, no Bangladesh, and 16th of December would've been like the 15th or the 14th. A uniform curriculum ensures federative perfection, right Balochistan?
3) 'Committee Member Zubaida Jalal, who was the federal education minister in the previous regime, went as far as calling the plan to hand the education ministry to the provinces a threat to the federation'.
See point number 2.
4) Carrying on Zubaida Jalal also stated '...she feared that provinces would make changes in the history, Islamic studies and geography books in the absence of a national curriculum, which ultimately would lead to ‘national ruin’ and Urdu would no longer be the national language'.
Would've loved to hear more on that bit about 'national ruin'. Also, I need to see some of these nefarious geographical designs that the provinces have apparently been harboring.
On a serious note, control over the education curriculum has been one of the reasons why the Pakistani state continues to exhibit such staunch authoritarian tendencies. It is also precisely the reason we haven't had a well-functioning federal system in the country. Mohammad Bin Qasim is not my hero. Neither is Shah Wali Ullah. Urdu is not my mother tongue. I would've complained about this had there been a Muslim League government in charge but without the element of surprise. To see this coming from the PPP, supposedly the party of wafaaq and the zanjeer of 4 provinces, is simply depressing.
May the Force be with Pakistan. We sure as hell need it.
Friday, 10 December 2010
The Intellectual Basis of Punjabi Politics
When we talk about the the PPP and it's associated problems, the most common points raised are about its dependence on captive votes, about its leadership crisis, and more importantly, its opportunistic, and patronage plagued system. For the more nuanced observers, the primary reason for this is that the party has not only moved away from its original theoretical basis, but has also failed to theoretically contextualize itself in the post-Zia period. This form of disengagement and the accompanying unwillingness to talk about more abstract notions of party ideology has highlighted several contradictions in the present day scenario, such as the inherent struggle to handle populist, pro-poor interventions on one hand, and the neo-liberal baggage carried by a multi-lateral trained Finance Minister on the other. The marginalization of the left in the PPP by its own leader was the earliest example of opportunism sidelining party ethos and similarly, the current behaviour of turning somewhat of a deaf ear towards textbook liberal voices in its ranks is perhaps a repeat performance of sorts.
A sensible route towards avoiding theoretical, and subsequently practical contradictions, is if a political party, representing a particular socio-economic class, derives its leadership from two possible sources. One source is from the class itself. If it's a party of the poor, the poor lead the party - which all things considered, is something that's not going to happen anytime soon in Pakistan. Hence the other viable source is from a party-elite disciplined by ideology in a way that makes them completely cognizant with the problems and world-view of the class they eventually represent. However, when both of these two sources fail, the vacuum left by this crisis of sorts is eventually filled by opportunists, cronies, and half-baked ideologues.
This is, at least in theory, part of the explanation for the PPP's evolution and why it does what it does. As unpalatable as this is for liberals/progressives in the country, the flip-side of the coin is just downright frightening.
The sad tale is such that over the last 25-30 years, Punjab has been witness to the emergence of an urban Muslim League that has achieved almost complete harmony between its politics, the prevailing intellectual basis of its surroundings, and most importantly, the world-view of its supporters. Whether it was by design or by accident, the fact remains that multiple shifts, some in state policy and some in the nature of the economy, have transformed the Muslim League into the most socially organic party in the province, and probably only second to the MQM in the entire country. The Muslim League, for the lack of a better description, has a fairly solid intellectual basis.
What, one may rightly ask, is the intellectual basis for Khawaja Saad Rafique? Our first instinct would be to say absolutely none - with the reason being that amongst certain circles, their exists a tendency to dismiss right-wing, reactionary, conservative discourse, as somehow less intellectual than liberal/progressive discourse. Perhaps at an objective level, this might even be true, but as far as Punjab is concerned, the dominant narrative is nationalist, largely conservative and mostly pro-middle-class in nature.
So where exactly does this dominant narrative take shape? Well for starters, in our higher-education system, where a certain 'brand' of history and science not only influences students who graduate into society, but also students that end up becoming teachers themselves. The next step in the shaping process takes place at the level of media. Popular literature (Shahabnama type), as well as print and electronic media, further creates pockets for conservative thought to flourish, hence entrenching itself as the dominant world-view of media consumers i.e. the urban middle-classes. Finally, civil society organizations (religious or otherwise), create platforms for social engagement and the mutual reinforcement of such ideas. The average Punjabi urbanite is more likely to interact with his peers in the Anjuman-i-Tajiran meeting as opposed to the Anjuman-i-Taraqi-Pasand-Musanafeen meeting. (or in the local after-prayers meet and greet as opposed to the seculars anonymous group)
Okay so how does the Muslim League figure into all of this?
Firstly, the primary building block of this 25-30 year old intellectual tradition is capitalism/private property/economic mobility, due to which the individualized notion of material success has become increasingly entrenched as urban Punjab has grown. The services economy feeds into this new way of thinking about the economy, and most importantly, the memories of Bhutto's nationalization remain fresh in the older generation. Punjab has become a rabidly capitalist society, if not in the vein of Weberian capitalism, but in some indigenous variant which is equally aggressive. And for the sake of our discussion, there is nothing there that goes against what the Muslim League stands for.
Secondly, Punjabi discourse is largely establishment driven Pakistani discourse, (with a slightly heightened sense of Punjabi-ness). Hence India remains the enemy, the army remains the guardian of our ideological and geographical boundaries (which errs on occasions but insaan khataa kaa putla hay) etc. Again, there's no fundamental disconnect between that and the politics of the Muslim League. The ML might have been anti-Musharraf, but it's certainly no fauj-dushman, and while there might be certain individuals who prefer a closer relationship with India, most of it's leadership and it's support base is decidedly hawkish. In the same vein, even voters who dislike the ML leadership because of its actions (corruption etc), will rarely ever oscillate to any other party. This is the biggest example of how strong this intellectual cognizance actually is. Anecdotally speaking, even if Ansar Abbasi criticizes Nawaz Sharif day in day out (which he doesn't), can you imagine him voting for any other party, especially the PPP?
Thirdly, various variants of Islamic beliefs in urban Punjab manage to find themselves in line with the Muslim League's vague position on religion. This is where i believe the Jamaat loses out because in its insistence on Shariah and Khilaafat as the ultimate goal, it drives away the so-called soft-right in our cities. In their heads, all this Khilaafat business is clearly bad for business. (see issue number 1). On other hand the Muslim League busies itself with moral policing through state policy, and by paying token lip-service to Kashmir and other pretend pan-Islamic causes.
So as a consequence of these three aspects of public discourse, the Muslim League has finally managed to root itself in the masses to a certain degree. Unlike the PPP, which faces the near-impossible task of rooting itself in multiple discourses across 4 provinces, the ML has entrenched itself in fairly homogenous surroundings. Maybe this will be the ultimate hurdle in it breaking out of Punjab, but at the very least it creates the chance for it to act at the national level without being a national level actor. For the PPP, sadly enough, the task is becoming more difficult as it continues to duck and weave in macro-politics whilst largely ignoring party-building in the present-day context. In the current scenario, it's the Muslim League that's turned into the party of ideology, and that ladies and gentlemen is something i never thought i'd say.
Special thanks to my senior colleague Dr Zaigham Habib for initiating this conversation in the first place.
A sensible route towards avoiding theoretical, and subsequently practical contradictions, is if a political party, representing a particular socio-economic class, derives its leadership from two possible sources. One source is from the class itself. If it's a party of the poor, the poor lead the party - which all things considered, is something that's not going to happen anytime soon in Pakistan. Hence the other viable source is from a party-elite disciplined by ideology in a way that makes them completely cognizant with the problems and world-view of the class they eventually represent. However, when both of these two sources fail, the vacuum left by this crisis of sorts is eventually filled by opportunists, cronies, and half-baked ideologues.
This is, at least in theory, part of the explanation for the PPP's evolution and why it does what it does. As unpalatable as this is for liberals/progressives in the country, the flip-side of the coin is just downright frightening.
The sad tale is such that over the last 25-30 years, Punjab has been witness to the emergence of an urban Muslim League that has achieved almost complete harmony between its politics, the prevailing intellectual basis of its surroundings, and most importantly, the world-view of its supporters. Whether it was by design or by accident, the fact remains that multiple shifts, some in state policy and some in the nature of the economy, have transformed the Muslim League into the most socially organic party in the province, and probably only second to the MQM in the entire country. The Muslim League, for the lack of a better description, has a fairly solid intellectual basis.
What, one may rightly ask, is the intellectual basis for Khawaja Saad Rafique? Our first instinct would be to say absolutely none - with the reason being that amongst certain circles, their exists a tendency to dismiss right-wing, reactionary, conservative discourse, as somehow less intellectual than liberal/progressive discourse. Perhaps at an objective level, this might even be true, but as far as Punjab is concerned, the dominant narrative is nationalist, largely conservative and mostly pro-middle-class in nature.
So where exactly does this dominant narrative take shape? Well for starters, in our higher-education system, where a certain 'brand' of history and science not only influences students who graduate into society, but also students that end up becoming teachers themselves. The next step in the shaping process takes place at the level of media. Popular literature (Shahabnama type), as well as print and electronic media, further creates pockets for conservative thought to flourish, hence entrenching itself as the dominant world-view of media consumers i.e. the urban middle-classes. Finally, civil society organizations (religious or otherwise), create platforms for social engagement and the mutual reinforcement of such ideas. The average Punjabi urbanite is more likely to interact with his peers in the Anjuman-i-Tajiran meeting as opposed to the Anjuman-i-Taraqi-Pasand-Musanafeen meeting. (or in the local after-prayers meet and greet as opposed to the seculars anonymous group)
Okay so how does the Muslim League figure into all of this?
Firstly, the primary building block of this 25-30 year old intellectual tradition is capitalism/private property/economic mobility, due to which the individualized notion of material success has become increasingly entrenched as urban Punjab has grown. The services economy feeds into this new way of thinking about the economy, and most importantly, the memories of Bhutto's nationalization remain fresh in the older generation. Punjab has become a rabidly capitalist society, if not in the vein of Weberian capitalism, but in some indigenous variant which is equally aggressive. And for the sake of our discussion, there is nothing there that goes against what the Muslim League stands for.
Secondly, Punjabi discourse is largely establishment driven Pakistani discourse, (with a slightly heightened sense of Punjabi-ness). Hence India remains the enemy, the army remains the guardian of our ideological and geographical boundaries (which errs on occasions but insaan khataa kaa putla hay) etc. Again, there's no fundamental disconnect between that and the politics of the Muslim League. The ML might have been anti-Musharraf, but it's certainly no fauj-dushman, and while there might be certain individuals who prefer a closer relationship with India, most of it's leadership and it's support base is decidedly hawkish. In the same vein, even voters who dislike the ML leadership because of its actions (corruption etc), will rarely ever oscillate to any other party. This is the biggest example of how strong this intellectual cognizance actually is. Anecdotally speaking, even if Ansar Abbasi criticizes Nawaz Sharif day in day out (which he doesn't), can you imagine him voting for any other party, especially the PPP?
Thirdly, various variants of Islamic beliefs in urban Punjab manage to find themselves in line with the Muslim League's vague position on religion. This is where i believe the Jamaat loses out because in its insistence on Shariah and Khilaafat as the ultimate goal, it drives away the so-called soft-right in our cities. In their heads, all this Khilaafat business is clearly bad for business. (see issue number 1). On other hand the Muslim League busies itself with moral policing through state policy, and by paying token lip-service to Kashmir and other pretend pan-Islamic causes.
So as a consequence of these three aspects of public discourse, the Muslim League has finally managed to root itself in the masses to a certain degree. Unlike the PPP, which faces the near-impossible task of rooting itself in multiple discourses across 4 provinces, the ML has entrenched itself in fairly homogenous surroundings. Maybe this will be the ultimate hurdle in it breaking out of Punjab, but at the very least it creates the chance for it to act at the national level without being a national level actor. For the PPP, sadly enough, the task is becoming more difficult as it continues to duck and weave in macro-politics whilst largely ignoring party-building in the present-day context. In the current scenario, it's the Muslim League that's turned into the party of ideology, and that ladies and gentlemen is something i never thought i'd say.
Special thanks to my senior colleague Dr Zaigham Habib for initiating this conversation in the first place.
Sunday, 5 December 2010
Guest Post: 'The FSF, Bhutto, & the NAP' by Takhalus
O heart, stones and bricks are in captivity and dogs run free.
-Faiz
This story begins like many turning points in Pakistan’s troubled history in Liaqat Bagh. In March 1973, the opposition party’s had united together in to form the United Democratic Front. This motley alliance was nominally led by Pir Pagaro and consisted of the National Awami Party, Muslim League and religo-political partys like the Jamaat e Islami.
The alliance wanted a show of force in the Punjab at a time when the Pakistan Peoples Party seemed invincible in the province. This event coincided with the growing power of another force, the paramilitary Federal Security Force, established in 1972, by Bhutto its role was to "to enable a civilian government to avoid seeking the assistance of the armed forces in dealing with its responsibilities and problems."
Bhutto justified the FSF’s formation following a police strike in 1972, where he did not feel happy in calling the Army to takeover their role. He wanted a force which was personally loyal to him and could potentially thwart a coup. Whatever the reasoning, it soon became synonymous with extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses.
In June 1972, its first alleged targets was Dr Nazir Ahmed, MNA and a critic of Bhutto's politics and style of government, he was shot dead in his clinic.
This was a prelude to the Liaqat bagh rally, as the opposition rally gathered, firing erupted in which dozens were killed and injured. Despite the opposition protests, the government charged the opposition with having targeted their own rally!
And so begins the second part of the story, a relative of mine who for uncreative reasons I will call “D” was a senior civil servant posted in modern day Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
Apolitical by trade, our extended family was at best closer to the Muslim League. Still we had friends and family members who were affiliated with the NAP. One in particular was a NAP activist call “K”, was one of the many targets of the FSF.
“D” was approached by a senior person in the FSF, saying they knew of his family connections to “K” and that he was willing to offer a deal. In exchange for arranging an “encounter” with “K” (a euphemism for murder), he would be guaranteed a promotion and would be given a plum posting with a huge personal allowance.
Perturbed by the offer “D” sent a message to “K” through another relative to escape as his life was in danger. “K” realising the danger fled across the border into exile in Kabul.
This is not the end of the story, however, the FSF furious at having missed out on killing “K” decided to use other means to force his return from Kabul, they arrested his young 9 year old son and made his release conditional on “K”’s return.
Stopped by friends, “K” did not return, his unfortunate son had a psychotic breakdown before being released. “D” on the other hand was to suffer in his own way, Bhutto was said to be furious at “D”’s role and his career was to be permanently damaged. His annual confidential report was for the rest of his career mark him as a “Pakhtunistan” man.
“K” stayed in exile for over a decade before returning to Pakistan, he joined the newly formed Awami National Party and unsuccessfully contested two elections. Not having the resources of others he was dropped as a candidate and retired to a career of writing. His son was to never recover from the horrors of his imprisonment.
As for the FSF it continued to be implicated in extra judicial killings throughout Bhutto’s time, including the murder of Sardar Ataullah Mengals son in Karachi and attacks on opposition leaders rallies like Asghar Khan.
The FSF’s role as a protector against an impending coup proved a joke, its director a brutal man Masud Mahmood was to turn approver against Bhutto and play a crucial role in his farcical trial. It was formally disbanded in June 1977 by Zia-ul Haq.
The above story is one of a series of guest Blogposts on my favourite blogs. It is very closely based on true events; I have changed some details for both creative reasons and to keep characters anonymous. Please direct all hate mail to the respective blog owners and all appreciation to myself. Visit Shahid's blog for another guestpost on the road from Marx to Maududi
-Faiz
This story begins like many turning points in Pakistan’s troubled history in Liaqat Bagh. In March 1973, the opposition party’s had united together in to form the United Democratic Front. This motley alliance was nominally led by Pir Pagaro and consisted of the National Awami Party, Muslim League and religo-political partys like the Jamaat e Islami.
The alliance wanted a show of force in the Punjab at a time when the Pakistan Peoples Party seemed invincible in the province. This event coincided with the growing power of another force, the paramilitary Federal Security Force, established in 1972, by Bhutto its role was to "to enable a civilian government to avoid seeking the assistance of the armed forces in dealing with its responsibilities and problems."
Bhutto justified the FSF’s formation following a police strike in 1972, where he did not feel happy in calling the Army to takeover their role. He wanted a force which was personally loyal to him and could potentially thwart a coup. Whatever the reasoning, it soon became synonymous with extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses.
In June 1972, its first alleged targets was Dr Nazir Ahmed, MNA and a critic of Bhutto's politics and style of government, he was shot dead in his clinic.
This was a prelude to the Liaqat bagh rally, as the opposition rally gathered, firing erupted in which dozens were killed and injured. Despite the opposition protests, the government charged the opposition with having targeted their own rally!
And so begins the second part of the story, a relative of mine who for uncreative reasons I will call “D” was a senior civil servant posted in modern day Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
Apolitical by trade, our extended family was at best closer to the Muslim League. Still we had friends and family members who were affiliated with the NAP. One in particular was a NAP activist call “K”, was one of the many targets of the FSF.
“D” was approached by a senior person in the FSF, saying they knew of his family connections to “K” and that he was willing to offer a deal. In exchange for arranging an “encounter” with “K” (a euphemism for murder), he would be guaranteed a promotion and would be given a plum posting with a huge personal allowance.
Perturbed by the offer “D” sent a message to “K” through another relative to escape as his life was in danger. “K” realising the danger fled across the border into exile in Kabul.
This is not the end of the story, however, the FSF furious at having missed out on killing “K” decided to use other means to force his return from Kabul, they arrested his young 9 year old son and made his release conditional on “K”’s return.
Stopped by friends, “K” did not return, his unfortunate son had a psychotic breakdown before being released. “D” on the other hand was to suffer in his own way, Bhutto was said to be furious at “D”’s role and his career was to be permanently damaged. His annual confidential report was for the rest of his career mark him as a “Pakhtunistan” man.
“K” stayed in exile for over a decade before returning to Pakistan, he joined the newly formed Awami National Party and unsuccessfully contested two elections. Not having the resources of others he was dropped as a candidate and retired to a career of writing. His son was to never recover from the horrors of his imprisonment.
As for the FSF it continued to be implicated in extra judicial killings throughout Bhutto’s time, including the murder of Sardar Ataullah Mengals son in Karachi and attacks on opposition leaders rallies like Asghar Khan.
The FSF’s role as a protector against an impending coup proved a joke, its director a brutal man Masud Mahmood was to turn approver against Bhutto and play a crucial role in his farcical trial. It was formally disbanded in June 1977 by Zia-ul Haq.
The above story is one of a series of guest Blogposts on my favourite blogs. It is very closely based on true events; I have changed some details for both creative reasons and to keep characters anonymous. Please direct all hate mail to the respective blog owners and all appreciation to myself. Visit Shahid's blog for another guestpost on the road from Marx to Maududi
Wednesday, 1 December 2010
Post Culture-istan
'Ham kisee aisee cheez ko tasleem naheen kar saktay jo hamaari saqafat kay khilaaf ho'
'We cannot accept any such thing that is against our culture' (Many Douchebags)
The instigation to write something on this bifurcation between culture and post-culture came after a friend insisted that I was really lucky to have been born in the cultural capital of Pakistan. While the assertion itself is fairly silly, the fact that it came from the mouth of a Karachiite does make it a lot more gratifying. Regardless though, if we internalize the notion that Lahore happens to be our cultural capital, then it just makes sense to scratch the surface and asses the form of culture it's currently capitalizing on. Think about it for a second and the first thing that comes to your head is probably connected to the city's Anglo-Mughal heritage. So Shahi Qila, Shalimar Gardens, Badshahi Mosque and all other remnants of an ostentatious, decadent and unproductive time in our history become the first defining feature of our cultural center. This is all part of the larger culture package which also included remnants of our time as colonial subjects.
Okay, so maybe i'm being flippant here, but my point is that Lahore does not represent anything even remotely national, which, with all due respects to the city's residents, should be the first criteria in declaring some place as a cultural capital. The only cultural heritage that Lahore represents is it's own and that of a few surrounding areas, some of which don't even belong to the same country. As one of the largest homogenous urban centers in the world, Lahore has a pretty poor track record when it comes to representing diversity and national character. The Shahi Qila is a grand building, no doubt, but when you think about it, can a Balochi really relate to it. Heck can even a Punjabi relate to it? If the Indo-Persian elite ethos of the Mughals is our culture then our attention should really be towards reclaiming Samarkand and Bukhara.
Progressive thought, literary excellence and artistic endeavor, which gave the city it's national credentials during the post-independence period, has certainly gone down in Lahore over the last 30 years. What has replaced it is an ethos of modernity, orthodoxy and subversion that has yet to be defined and codified or even completely understood. So in the absence of a dynamic view on culture, we've slipped into the habit of harking back to the days of Akbar, Aurangzeb and Sir John Lawrence. (which btw also fits in well with the entire notion of Muslim supremacy in India but that's a thought for another day). The crystallization of this definition of culture takes place in popular media, and in textbook curricula, so it remains accessible and well-disemminated, especially when compared to any alternate forms of articulation. What do i find curious - and i pose this question to the readers as well - is that if the culture of one city is attached to a particular time and place in history, then are all subsequent periods simply 'post-culture' by definition?
Exhibit A: Culture
Exhibit B: Culture (part II)
The answer is increasingly tilting towards the affirmative. This entire post-culture syndrome has made me think about the recent showering of reactionary op-eds and i've gradually realized that they represent a classic (and warped) case of cultural defense. Take the example of Ansar Abbasi writing on Pakistan Fashion Week. His entire argument is premised on his understanding of what is culture and what is not culture. It's roughly the same logic that's used to declare Lahore as the cultural capital of the country even though any other representation in another part of the country is no less 'authentic' or 'cultural'. So when Ansar sahab talks about the possibility of a 'fire of obscenity engulfing decent households' he is primarily acting in his role as the knower and defender of A Pakistani culture (whatever that is).
The second case was that of Talat Hussain and his piece on Angelina Jolie. Leaving his larger point to one side, the lens of analysis used in the piece was simply aiding in the binary understanding of our culture in relation to her, and consequently, western culture. Again, Talat found Angelina's life story to be so completely out of line with his carefully demarcated Pakistani cultural sensibilities, that he actually had to write an entire piece on it. Now i dont intend to criticize the pieces themselves, since that's already been done by CafePyala, Kalakawa, and Tazeen (amongst others), but rather my sole aim is to show that the popular relationship with culture in this country is considerably static.
So if, for example, arranged marriages are codified as an important part of our culture, than all of us who've married or intend to marry a girl (or boy) of our own liking are basically cultural deviants. Another recent example is the cultural battle on Meher Bukhari's show which had Salman Taaseer as her guest, and her exhibiting some really twisted logic where anyone in support of amending or repealing the blasphemy laws is a 'Maghrib Nawaz', and hence by definition a cultural deviant. If anything, the entire debate by the soft-right in support of the blasphemy laws is one based on a conjoined understanding of culture and religion.
I'd say the biggest challenge within social discourse in Pakistan is trying to introduce a degree of dynamism in our understanding of culture and cultural practice. Without this much needed dynamism, we'll remain stuck in the duality that we see so prevalent in the country (especially in a place like Lahore). Arranged marriage is part of our sakaafat but people elope and end up marrying in court anyway. (Point being that there exists a pretty big disjunct between articulated culture and what we see in day to day practice). On an ending note, i want to share this epsiode of Kamran Shahid's show on the cinema industry in Pakistan. In certain places, the argument revolves around depiction of culture in Lollywood, so it's a pretty interesting angle to the entire culture/non-culture debate.
'We cannot accept any such thing that is against our culture' (Many Douchebags)
The instigation to write something on this bifurcation between culture and post-culture came after a friend insisted that I was really lucky to have been born in the cultural capital of Pakistan. While the assertion itself is fairly silly, the fact that it came from the mouth of a Karachiite does make it a lot more gratifying. Regardless though, if we internalize the notion that Lahore happens to be our cultural capital, then it just makes sense to scratch the surface and asses the form of culture it's currently capitalizing on. Think about it for a second and the first thing that comes to your head is probably connected to the city's Anglo-Mughal heritage. So Shahi Qila, Shalimar Gardens, Badshahi Mosque and all other remnants of an ostentatious, decadent and unproductive time in our history become the first defining feature of our cultural center. This is all part of the larger culture package which also included remnants of our time as colonial subjects.
Okay, so maybe i'm being flippant here, but my point is that Lahore does not represent anything even remotely national, which, with all due respects to the city's residents, should be the first criteria in declaring some place as a cultural capital. The only cultural heritage that Lahore represents is it's own and that of a few surrounding areas, some of which don't even belong to the same country. As one of the largest homogenous urban centers in the world, Lahore has a pretty poor track record when it comes to representing diversity and national character. The Shahi Qila is a grand building, no doubt, but when you think about it, can a Balochi really relate to it. Heck can even a Punjabi relate to it? If the Indo-Persian elite ethos of the Mughals is our culture then our attention should really be towards reclaiming Samarkand and Bukhara.
Progressive thought, literary excellence and artistic endeavor, which gave the city it's national credentials during the post-independence period, has certainly gone down in Lahore over the last 30 years. What has replaced it is an ethos of modernity, orthodoxy and subversion that has yet to be defined and codified or even completely understood. So in the absence of a dynamic view on culture, we've slipped into the habit of harking back to the days of Akbar, Aurangzeb and Sir John Lawrence. (which btw also fits in well with the entire notion of Muslim supremacy in India but that's a thought for another day). The crystallization of this definition of culture takes place in popular media, and in textbook curricula, so it remains accessible and well-disemminated, especially when compared to any alternate forms of articulation. What do i find curious - and i pose this question to the readers as well - is that if the culture of one city is attached to a particular time and place in history, then are all subsequent periods simply 'post-culture' by definition?
Exhibit A: Culture
Exhibit B: Culture (part II)
The answer is increasingly tilting towards the affirmative. This entire post-culture syndrome has made me think about the recent showering of reactionary op-eds and i've gradually realized that they represent a classic (and warped) case of cultural defense. Take the example of Ansar Abbasi writing on Pakistan Fashion Week. His entire argument is premised on his understanding of what is culture and what is not culture. It's roughly the same logic that's used to declare Lahore as the cultural capital of the country even though any other representation in another part of the country is no less 'authentic' or 'cultural'. So when Ansar sahab talks about the possibility of a 'fire of obscenity engulfing decent households' he is primarily acting in his role as the knower and defender of A Pakistani culture (whatever that is).
The second case was that of Talat Hussain and his piece on Angelina Jolie. Leaving his larger point to one side, the lens of analysis used in the piece was simply aiding in the binary understanding of our culture in relation to her, and consequently, western culture. Again, Talat found Angelina's life story to be so completely out of line with his carefully demarcated Pakistani cultural sensibilities, that he actually had to write an entire piece on it. Now i dont intend to criticize the pieces themselves, since that's already been done by CafePyala, Kalakawa, and Tazeen (amongst others), but rather my sole aim is to show that the popular relationship with culture in this country is considerably static.
So if, for example, arranged marriages are codified as an important part of our culture, than all of us who've married or intend to marry a girl (or boy) of our own liking are basically cultural deviants. Another recent example is the cultural battle on Meher Bukhari's show which had Salman Taaseer as her guest, and her exhibiting some really twisted logic where anyone in support of amending or repealing the blasphemy laws is a 'Maghrib Nawaz', and hence by definition a cultural deviant. If anything, the entire debate by the soft-right in support of the blasphemy laws is one based on a conjoined understanding of culture and religion.
I'd say the biggest challenge within social discourse in Pakistan is trying to introduce a degree of dynamism in our understanding of culture and cultural practice. Without this much needed dynamism, we'll remain stuck in the duality that we see so prevalent in the country (especially in a place like Lahore). Arranged marriage is part of our sakaafat but people elope and end up marrying in court anyway. (Point being that there exists a pretty big disjunct between articulated culture and what we see in day to day practice). On an ending note, i want to share this epsiode of Kamran Shahid's show on the cinema industry in Pakistan. In certain places, the argument revolves around depiction of culture in Lollywood, so it's a pretty interesting angle to the entire culture/non-culture debate.
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