On Balochistan: In Response to Ejaz Haider

Yes, we all know that nuanced discussion on the Balochistan question is seriously missing from our national press. While its non-existence in Urdu columns is understandable, given their tendency to tow the state's line, the relative absence of this topic in the English language press is what i used to find more confusing.

Not any more.

It turns out that any comment on the Baloch question ultimately transcends the specificity of its context and evolves into a question of treachery and patriotism. Showing an objective understanding or sympathizing with the armed struggle is, of course, a clear indication of treachery, while supporting the Pakistan army against the oppressive and angry Sardars is ultimately the right thing to do.

My amusement with the popular approach of looking at Balochistan was compounded after reading this Ejaz Haider column. As a friend put it, he might have gotten his facts right but his approach to analyzing the problem is symptomatic of our urban population, i.e., Balochistan is thought of in the same Mordor-ish fashion as FATA. So apart from the quintessentially orientalist gaze cast by distant observers, there's also the accompanying 'what-should-we-do-now' question.

'Let me put it up front: Balochistan needs to be healed — within Pakistan’s federal framework. Those who want freedom by resorting to violence and through the support of hostile elements have no place in any negotiating process unless they lay down arms. Let us also flag the point that the issue is about Balochistan’s grievances, not just Baloch grievances. Lest anyone forget, Balochistan houses other ethnic groups too.'

Rest assured, Ejaz sahab, those involved in armed struggle have little interest in negotiating with a state they perceive to be a colonizing entity. From their end, the situation has crossed the point of no-return and table-talk ceases to look like a viable option. In the interest of fairness though, his point about other ethnicities is completely valid. Appeasement of the Baloch cannot be done in abstraction from the material conditions of Pashtuns, Hazaras, Punjabis and other groups living in the same space. The problem however exists at two levels: 1) Resolving conflict and 2) Creating cohesion within the province. In my humble opinion, it's the first one that needs to be addressed first.

Moving on,

'There is deep irony in the fact that the Baloch sub-nationalists who don’t tire of talking about their rights have shied from fighting the internal battle for more egalitarian social structures which could have freed them from the debilitating influence of the sardari system. It is that system, also exploited by successive governments, which has kept Baloch areas undeveloped.
Look at the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), led by Hyrbiar Marri, son of Khair Bakhsh Marri. Educated, like most scions of the sardars (while the common Baloch remains pathetically uneducated), he is based in London. It was his group that took responsibility, among other terrorist acts, for killing the innocent Punjabi labourers.'

It took approximately two paragraphs to get to the first mention of oppressive tribal structures. This 12th century hangover are a real pain for our urban population who perceive them to be a vile form of exploitation, less vile in any case than labor exploitation in industrialized Karachi or domestic servant exploitation in suburbia across the country. My point is not to compare two forms of exploitation, both of which, by the way, are equally bad and equally deserving of eradication. My point is to highlight the larger problem with nationalist narratives.

In the 1940's, the political figures involved in the movement for provincial autonomy were in the same situation currently found in Balochistan. You either indulge in elite politics using pre-existing structures of social organization for mobilization, or you remove the layer of intermediaries and engage with the people. With your popular political class emerging from the landed elites of Sindh and Punjab, the choice made back then was the same form of expediency that we see in Balochistan now. Sardars will use notions of tribal loyalty and vertical hierarchy to mobilize support for their 'sub-nationalist' cause. What is even more telling is that successive regimes of our beloved Mumlikat Khudadad e Pakistan have exhibited the same form of expediency, in Punjab, in Sindh and yes that's right, in Balochistan.

I might be completely wrong here, but i find it a bit rich on Ejaz Haider's part to use two different yardsticks of judging the legitimacy of nationalism. At one level he's suggesting that these Baloch leaders have done nothing to remove exploitation from within their own system and at another level he is arguing for the reconciliation of a federation that itself has a miserable track record of cleansing social oppression over the last 63 years. Call me blind but I'd like to know which social structures we've gotten rid of since independence. As far as i see it, Baloch nationalism is in one sense a microcosm of Pakistani nationalism, which itself is symbolic of nationalism almost everywhere in the world. Vertically aligned, largely regressive, and ultimately oppressive.

'Balochistan in general and the Baloch in particular need to get their rights. But negotiations must be within the federal framework. Equally, the Baloch must realise the irony of fighting for their rights while living in a stultifying tribal system. '

Same way every hari, landless laborer, working class poor must recognize the irony of their existence in the larger framework of Pakistan. I think this op-ed was well-intentioned, but it betrayed a lack of understanding of the larger scheme of things. Baloch nationalism, as much as we would hate to admit, is a somewhat popular phenomenon. This particular episode of Naseem Zehra's show with Baloch students is quite indicative of the fact that the struggle is not all angry Sardars and bearded tribals. It has all the genuine ingredients of an imagined nationalism: complete with historical continuity, tails of oppression, and culmination of a struggle to seek glorious salvation.

Solution to the Baloch question asks for the state to think outside of its usual domain of elite politiciking. Propping up one tanzeem and one Sardar against another is not working. Raisani, despite winning a half-baked election, is considered to be even less legitimate in the province than Karzai is in Afghanistan. The way out is to engage with the people of Balochistan, regardless of their ethnic community, and to erode the legitimacy of a vertically organized struggle. Whether the Pakistani state has the ability to break its own paradigmatic constraint and actually do something pro-people for once remains to be seen.